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What’s New About the New Terrorism and How Dangerous Is It? 
 
The ‘new terrorism’ is said to be more networked, ad hoc, lethal and 
dangerous  than the old.  This assessment of these claims concludes that 
terrorism currently differs little from its previous manifestations, except 
for the somewhat increased likelihood that a chemical, biological, 
nuclear or radiological weapon might be used by terrorists.  This does 
not necessarily mean that terrorism is more dangerous than it was.  The 
critical factor in assessing the threat posed by terrorism is whether it is 
used strategically.         
 
Over the past decade, the belief has grown among some who study terrorism that 
it is changing, that it has become ‘the new terrorism’.1  This terrorism is reputedly 
distinguished from the old by a new structure, a new kind of personnel, and a new 
attitude toward violence.  The new structure is a network, facilitated by information 
technology, the new personnel are amateurs, who often come together in ad hoc or 
transitory groupings, and the new attitude an increased willingness to cause mass 
casualties, perhaps by using chemical, biological, nuclear or radiological (CBNR) 
weapons.  Taken together, network organization and amateur participation suggest that 
the ‘new terrorists’ no longer need state sponsorship as much as their predecessors did.  
The impression left by accounts of the new terrorism is that it is more dangerous or at 
least more difficult to counter than its predecessor. 
Now that this view has been well developed and ably presented, it is time to 
assess it.  Ultimately, we must ask whether what we see in terrorism today is really new 
and in what ways and if it poses more of a threat than the old terrorism.  On balance, we 
will conclude that there is little that is new in the new terrorism and what is new is not 
necessarily more dangerous or difficult to counter than the old.   
 
The New Terrorism 
A good place to begin an analysis of the new terrorism is its networked structure. 
Terrorists are now able and willing to develop network forms of organization for the 
same reason that businesses are.  The information revolution, by lowering the cost of 
communication, allows organizations to push functions outside a controlling hierarchical 
structure.  Organizations can thus flatten out their pyramids of authority and control and 
approach a network form, a group of more or less autonomous, dispersed entities, linked 
by advanced communications and perhaps nothing more than a common purpose.  
Motivating or compelling the move from hierarchy to network are the advantages that an 
organization acquires as it transforms itself.  It becomes more flexible, adaptive and 
resilient because each of its units senses and reacts on its own in loose coordination with 
the others.  This multiplies the opportunities for the organization to learn, making it more 
flexible and adaptive.  The organization becomes more resilient because if one or even 
several of its constituent entities are destroyed, the others carry on.  A network, unlike a 
hierarchy, cannot be destroyed by decapitation.  
In the case of terrorists, the loosely linked autonomous entities that make up a 
network might be individuals, such as Ramzi Yousef, who organized the World Trade 
Center bombing, or cells such as those involved in the leaderless resistance of the 
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Christian Patriot movement in the United States.  Leaderless resistance is ‘a system of 
organization that is based upon the cell organization, but does not have any central 
control or direction. . . .  [A]ll individuals and groups operate independently of each 
other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or 
instruction, as would those who belong to a typical pyramid organization’.2   The entities 
making up terrorist networks might also be large, more formal, even hierarchical 
organizations that work together without any common hierarchy or central commanding 
authority between them.  Whatever the components of the network, what makes it a 
network is the absence of this central authority or control.3  It is this feature that gives 
networks their flexibility, adaptiveness and resilience, allowing them advantages over 
organizations like the U.S. government, which appear more and more to be hierarchical 
industrial-age dinosaurs.  
 One manifestation of this networking is the proliferation of the amateur terrorist 
and the ad hoc terrorist group.  Amateurs come together with the like-minded to conduct 
a terrorist attack and then disband.  They do not receive training or other logistical 
support from state-sponsors but rely on networks of supporters, learning what they need 
to know from publications or the world-wide web or demobilized soldiers.  Because they 
have only an informal organizational structure and no permanent existence, it is difficult 
to spot such groups and take steps to counteract them.  As transitory groups operating as 
and supported by networks, they have no infrastructure, and do not benefit from a state 
sponsor’s infrastructure, the sort of assets that conventional military power can place at 
risk.  
One reason amateurs and ad hoc groups can operate as they do is an often 
unremarked upon aspect of the communication revolution.  In addition to facilitating 
networks, the communication revolution also facilitates fundraising or, more generally, 
the mobilizing of resources—political and individual support, and knowledge, as well as 
money—that all terrorist organizations must do.  The declining cost and increasing ease 
of communicating over great distances means that terrorist groups have greatly increased 
the potential pool of resources they can draw on.  They can now more easily appeal to an 
ethnic or religious Diaspora or to political sympathizers around the world.  They can also 
more easily get their message to a world-wide audience or to the people of the country or 
countries they deem most important in their struggle.  Through the world-wide web, they 
have access to important sources of information.  
An established government’s disadvantages when confronting amateur networked 
terrorists are all the more sobering because of the apparent increased willingness of ‘new 
terrorists’ to inflict mass casualties.  Analysts explain this trend by pointing to a number 
of factors, such as the diffusion of lethal technologies; the erosion of taboos against the 
use of weapons of mass destruction; the absence of restraint on amateur terrorists who, 
having no organization or sponsor to protect, see no reason to limit extreme violence that 
might generate a backlash; and the continuing need of terrorists to find new ways of 
attracting attention.  In addition to these factors, analysts have tended to emphasize the 
importance of religion.  Religiously motivated terrorists are thought more likely to 
conduct mass casualty attacks because, unlike politically motivated terrorists, they are not 
constrained by the fear that excessive violence will offend some constituency, since they 
care only about a small circle of the elect.  Nor, for this reason, unlike politically 
motivated terrorists, is their intent to pressure or persuade their opponents.  For religious 
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terrorists, the world is divided into ‘us’ and ‘them’, the saved and the damned, and the 
damned are to be destroyed.  This is especially so if the religious impulse takes on a 
millennial character and the desire for a new order makes plausible the destruction of the 
old.  This has led some to speculate that religiously motivated terrorists might even be 
willing to use weapons of mass destruction in their attacks, as might others whose 
purpose is not to intimidate or persuade but rather simply to destroy.  Such urges, coupled 
with the increased availability of more potent weapons, suggests that terrorists arrayed in 
a network or as a network of networks have apparently become opponents whose ability 
to dance circles around governments is surpassed only by the increased lethality of their 
punch. 
 The new terrorists appear to be formidable enemies.   But are the disadvantages 
governments labor under with regard to them quite as severe as this brief sketch 
suggests?  For that matter, is the new terrorism new?  To answer both of these questions, 
we may start where our sketch of the new terrorism started, with the question of network 
structure. 
 
Is the New Terrorism New? 
The striking thing about the networked structure of the new terrorism is that it 
differs little from the structure of the old terrorism.  The Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO), for example, was itself an umbrella group, like Hizballah,4 whose 
dominant faction, Fatah, did not have a monopoly of power and whose constituent parts 
have had different relations with each other, splintering and adhering and developing 
different policies and strategies.  One analyst of the PLO has spoken of it as a ‘network of 
relationships.’5  Furthermore, the PLO was networked externally, by some reports, with 
up to 21 different organizations that the PLO had previously trained or supplied with 
weapons and other logistical support.6  Marxist or left-wing revolutionary groups also 
became network-like as ideological differentiation lead to structural complexity.  Many 
of these groups, such as the Red Army Faction (RAF), were, despite the hierarchical 
connotation of the word ‘army’, not very hierarchical at all.  The RAF spawned second 
and third generations haphazardly and remained more a collection of terrorists sharing a 
common purpose than a hierarchical organization.  And these collectivities, too, were 
parts of a larger network, getting support, for example, from Warsaw Pact members and 
training from Middle Eastern terrorist groups.7  The role of Osama Bin Laden as a 
wealthy patron of loosely affiliated terrorists connected by a common purpose rather than 
a hierarchical or well-developed organizational structure has a precedent in the work of 
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli in the 1960s and early 1970s.8    
We can find evidence of what is now called network structure even further back 
in the history of terrorist organizations.  One existed in Iran in the 1940s, for example.  In 
fact there is a very long tradition of these kinds of networks in the Middle East.9  They 
are identical in structure and character to the networks associated with bin Laden.  The 
similarity arises, presumably, from a common source in the informal networked character 
of Sunni Islam.  In this light, the emergence in the Middle East of organizations less 
hierarchical than those that operated in the 1970s and 1980s is a return to a more 
traditional model as the distorting effect of an alien pattern of thought (Marxism-
Leninism) dissipates.   
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Terrorists may be increasing their use of information technology10 and modern 
communications may facilitate networks but networks as a structure for terrorist or 
violent non-state groups are not new.  Indeed, in 1983, reflecting on 30 years study of 
‘extralegal violent organizations’, and five years experience in the Polish underground 
during Word War II, one analyst concluded that these ‘extralegal violent organizations’ 
had possessed during this period a network structure, a structure similar to that 
considered new by analysts in the late 1990s.11    
If the non-hierarchical, networked character of terrorism is not new, what about 
the claims that terrorism now relies more on amateurs and less on state support?  All 
terrorists are amateurs when they begin.  If their mistakes are not fatal, they may learn 
and survive long enough to become professionals.  If we have seen amateurs and ad hoc 
groups among Islamist terrorists, it may be because the international Islamic movement 
(as opposed to nationalist movements like Hamas and Hizballah) is relatively young.  As 
the principle of the survival of the proficient operates, we are likely to see the number of 
professionals increase.  Similarly, we are likely to see, indeed, we are already seeing, 
fewer ad hoc groups.  As the pressure brought to bear against these groups increases and 
they come to appreciate the costs of operating as terrorists, we are also likely to see state 
sponsorship or support become more important to them.  In fact, this has already 
happened to bin Laden.  He has found state support necessary, as have most terrorists.  In 
short, the amateur and ad hoc character of the new terrorism is not so much new as 
another manifestation of the life cycle of terrorism.   
Although the networked, ad hoc character of contemporary terrorism is not new, 
the terrorism we experience today, at least the international terrorism we experience, is 
probably more lethal than it was when it first emerged three decades ago and more likely 
to produce mass casualties.  We can construct what we might call a lethality index for 
international terrorism (Table 1)12 by dividing the number of casualties and fatalities in 
any given period by the total number of incidents in the same period.  
 












    
1969-1980    .55      1.61  
1987-1999    .73    33    5.25  226 
Five year 
increments 
    
1969-1973    .24       .99  
1976-1980    .72   200    1.84 (1.52)    86 (53) 
1986-1990    .75      4    2.63    43 
1995-1999    .98 (.75)    31 (0)   10.68 (3.70)  306 (41) 
Source:  U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism.  Data refer to international terrorism 
only. 
 
This table shows that international terrorism has literally become more lethal, 
whether measured over twelve year periods during the earliest and latest phases of 
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modern international terrorism or in selected five year increments over the last 31 years.  
The largest per centage increase in lethality occurred, however, in the late 1970s.  Since 
then, lethality has rested at a higher plateau rather than surged ahead.  Combining 
casualties with fatalities produces evidence that should be of greater concern because it 
indicates a tendency toward mass casualty attacks, especially over the last five years.  
Indices such as these must be treated with caution.  One particularly lethal year 
can strongly affect statistics for lethality and casualties but a particularly lethal year may 
not be a trend or even the beginning of a trend.  Furthermore, the number of international 
terrorist attacks in a given period ‘is strongly correlated to wars, major regional crises, 
and other divisive world events’ and so may reflect not underlying trends in terrorism but 
‘fluctuations in inter-state tensions’.13  Indeed, since calculations about lethality and 
tendencies toward mass casualties, such as those in Table 1, are based on data for 
international terrorism, the only aspect of terrorism for which data have been kept 
systematically, they do not allow us to make generalizations about terrorism at all.  The 
lethality of contemporary international terrorism might appear in a different, more benign 
light, if we could compare it accurately, for example, with the lethality of anti-colonial 
terrorism in the immediate post-Word War II years or with other manifestations of 
terrorism prior to Word War II.   Finally, this index is not the only way to measure the 
lethality of terrorism or a tendency toward mass casualties.  With these limitations in 
mind, we may conclude only that the lethality index in Table 1 suggests that international 
terrorism has become more lethal and more likely to produce mass casualties. 
It is worth looking more closely, however, at the rise in mass casualties over the 
last five years.  If we remove from the statistics Aum Shinrikyo’s sarin attack in the 
Tokyo Subway (1995, 12 killed; 5,500 casualties), the Tamil Tiger truck bombing of the 
Central Bank in Colombo (1996, 90 killed; 1400 casualties) and the truck bombing of the 
U.S. Embassy in Nairobi (1998, 291 killed; 5000 casualties) the tendency toward mass 
casualty attacks becomes less pronounced.  With these three events removed from the 
calculations, the per centage increase in casualties in 1995-1999 (shown in parentheses in 
Table 1) becomes lower than the increase in 1976-1980, when fatalities also increased the 
most.  The per centage increase in 1995-1999 is higher than in 1976- 1980 even if we 
remove from the statistics (shown in parentheses in Table 1) three of the international 
terrorist incidents that caused the most casualties between 1976 and 1980.14  Again, 
without these three attacks, the casualty profile over the last decade or so appears to be a 
plateau rather than a forward surge.  In other words, 0.17 per cent of international 
terrorist attacks in 1995-1999 caused 67 per cent of the casualties.  The vast majority of 
such attacks continue to produce a few casualties.  The claim that there is a tendency 
toward mass casualty attacks rests, then, on a very few cases compared to the total 
number of international terrorist attacks.  Does this prove that there is a new trend toward 
mass casualties?  At the moment, it is not possible to be certain.  In 1999 and 2000, for 
example, no mass casualty attack occurred.  
If the issue of whether there is a new trend toward mass casualty attacks remains 
at least somewhat open, then we may also wonder about the connection between 
religiously motivated terrorism and the willingness to kill indiscriminately and even use 
weapons of mass destruction, which features so prominently in discussions of the new 
terrorism.  First, we must note that historical evidence does not necessarily support the 
notion that religious groups are more likely to use chemical or biological agents.  For 
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example, one analysis of a database of contamination incidents from 1968-1987 found 
that only 0.5 per cent had a religious connection.  A survey of bioterrorism and biocrimes 
since 1900 found that only 2 of 54 confirmed or probable or possible uses of bioagents, 
or 3.7 per cent, had a religious connection.  (60 per cent of the events were criminal, 15 
per cent terrorist, including the two with a religious connection, and 22 per cent were 
carried out by a state.) 15 
Religion may appear infrequently in these databases because an argument made 
about the old terrorism applies to the new variant, even when religion is involved.  To the 
extent that terrorists with religious motivations also have political and social agendas—
for example, the establishment of an Islamic state—they will labor under the same kinds 
of constraints that terrorists with political motivations labor under as they struggle to 
achieve their political goals.  They will have to worry about the popular reaction to their 
violence.  This does not mean that a religious group or a political group would never 
commit mass casualty attacks.  It means only that such groups have reasons not to do so.  
Even if religiously inspired terrorists do not have political goals, politics will not leave 
them alone.  Whether or not they had political objectives or thought about them, Islamic 
fundamentalists in Egypt and Algeria were undone in part by the political problems that 
arose from their extreme violence.16  Their own supporters and sympathizers turned 
against them.  Over time, even militant Islamist groups will learn a lesson about the use 
of extreme violence—there are good reasons to avoid it—or suffer a decline in life 
expectancy. 
This logic of action and reaction applies even to the international Islamists who 
support jihad around the world and who have been responsible for several mass casualty 
attacks.  Their violent rhetoric and practice has made them the principal terrorist target of 
the United States and other countries and increased the cooperation and resources brought 
to bear against them and those who provide them haven.  These measures have been 
effective.  Again, this does not mean that international Islamists will not use extreme 
violence, only that they pay a price for doing so and, therefore, have reasons to think 
about the utility of mass casualty attacks.  This means that the new terrorists face the 
same constraint as the old.  
Another way to approach the role of religion in the new terrorism is to look at 
recent examples of mass casualty attacks (an attack in which over 200 were injured).  
During the 1990s, such attacks have been committed by Hizballah (two); Hamas; the 
group associated with Ramzi Yousef; Aum Shinrikyo, the Japanese sect; the Tamil 
Tigers; Kach, a Jewish extremist group; and terrorists associated with Osama bin Laden 
(two, Khobar Towers and the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.)  Religiously motivated terrorists 
figure prominently but not exclusively in this list (seven of nine).  (The Tamil Tigers are 
a traditional national liberation movement and the case of Ramzi Yousef apparently tells 
us more about his peculiar psychology than about religious motivation.)17  In five of the 
seven cases where religious motivation was present (Kach, Hamas, Hizballah (two), and 
Khobar Towers) the methods used (bombing, shooting) and results obtained (around 200 
casualties) were similar to attacks carried out in the past by groups that did not have a 
religious motivation.  In the two remaining cases with a religious motivation (the U.S. 
Embassy bombing in Nairobi and Aum Shinrikyo's attack in the Tokyo subway), where 
truly mass casualties occurred, only one involved a true weapon of mass destruction 
(Aum Shinrikyo's attack). 
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What may we conclude from this brief review of these cases?  First, mass casualty 
attacks, like another unusual form of terrorism, suicide attacks,18 are not exclusively a 
religious phenomenon.  Indeed, most terrorist groups with religious motivations today 
conduct their operations with methods and results (in numbers wounded) that do not 
differ from their secular predecessors.  On the other hand, the Tamil Tigers, a non-
religious terrorist organization, have conducted an attack that resulted in truly mass 
casualties.  Finally, sects like Aum, unlike other religiously motivated groups, may be 
sufficiently divorced from this world and so intent on another that it makes sense to them 
to create casualties more massive than any we have seen, and thus to use weapons of 
mass destruction.  This may be the only case in which religious motivation and such 
terrible weapons go together without any countervailing argument or motivation.  
Fortunately, in this case, precisely the psychology that makes the use of weapons of mass 
destruction plausible to such a group—alienation, paranoia, delusions, inflexible devotion 
to the rulings of a leader—may make it less capable of the engineering and planning 
necessary to use them.19  More generally, this review of these cases of mass casualty 
attacks suggests that “it is not religion per se, but the type of religion that is most 
critical”20 in assessing the connection between religious motivation and mass casualty 
attacks.  Indeed, given the variety and complexity of religious motivation, the term 
‘religiously motivated terrorism’ is not analytically useful.    
More tightly framing the possible association of a religious impulse to mass 
casualty attacks and to violence with weapons of mass destruction should not be 
understood as a denial that a CBNR terrorist attack might occur.  The other reasons cited 
by analysts to explain why such an attack might happen remain valid.  In addition, since 
conventional war has become more lethal,21 we might suspect that unconventional war 
will as well.  It may be that 1998, the most lethal year for terrorism on record, is the 
beginning of a long-term trend that will see unconventional means of political violence 
follow the trail blazed by conventional means.  Even if it is not, it remains true that the 
likelihood of CBNR weapon use has probably increased.  
In sum, the one thing new about the new terrorism is the increased likelihood of 
the use of CBNR weapons.  Terrorists have always been networked and, initially, 
amateurish.  They may now be no more or only a little more lethal or prone to commit 
mass casualty attacks than they were 20 years ago.  Indeed, if bin Laden’s organization is 
different from most other terrorist organizations, it is not because it is amateurish and 
networked but because its personnel are more professional (or at least experienced—from 
conflict in Afghanistan and elsewhere) and better organized, not to mention better 
financed, than many of its predecessors.   
 
How Dangerous is the New Terrorism? 
Our review of the new terrorism generates an interesting question.  If networks 
are such powerful tools, and terrorists have been networked for thirty years or more, why 
have governments not been more threatened by terrorists?  There are a number of 
reasons, of course, from the superior resources of governments to the international 
cooperation that they have managed to achieve.  Restricting ourselves to the effect of 
networks in the struggle between governments and terrorists, we can see that there are 
two reasons why terrorists have not posed a more serious threat to governments.  First, a 
network can be understood ‘as an informal community of individuals who share common 
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norms or values. . . .  Understood in this fashion, networks are not an alternative to 
hierarchies but rather are typically overlaid on top of formal organizations, and are 
frequently critical to the latter's proper functioning.’22  Thus, despite its hierarchical 
structure, the U.S. government, for example, can be seen as a network.  Of Hizballah it 
has been said that ‘the formal structure is highly bureaucratic [but] interactions among 
members are volatile and do not form rigid lines of control.’23  The very same could be 
said of the structure of the federal government’s Executive branch, not to mention 
relations between this branch and its legislative counterpart or those between the federal 
and state governments.  In the Executive branch, no one is in charge except the President 
and he is too busy to exert his authority over more than a handful of issues.  Thus, often 
autonomous agencies pursue their objectives without the benefit of ‘rigid lines of 
control’.     
True to its networked character, the U.S. government has shown a notable ability 
to adapt when dealing with terrorism.  Until recently without any formal central direction, 
coordinated only by a committee of equals, united by shared norms and values, its 
constituent agencies have developed a series of new ways to combat terrorism, from 
international conventions against highjacking, to a hostage rescue capability, to economic 
sanctions, to military retaliation, and then renditions, as terrorism changed and old 
capabilities appeared to lose effectiveness.24  Moreover, to counter terrorism, this 
network called the U.S. government has linked itself bilaterally and multilaterally in 
networks with other governments and international organizations through treaties and 
agreements.  Again, in keeping with network characteristics, such arrangements have 
worked best when norms were shared. 
The successes of the United States in its confrontation with terrorism thus validate 
the notion that it takes a network to fight a network.25  But we should not think of such 
fights as struggles of invincible titans.  Networks have weaknesses; this is the second 
reason that terrorists have not posed a greater threat.  At least one of the theorists of 
leaderless resistance recognizes this.  ‘While it is true that much could be said against this 
kind of structure [leaderless resistance] as a method of resistance, it must be kept in mind 
that leaderless resistance is a child of necessity.  The alternatives to it have been shown to 
be unworkable or impractical’26 because of the successes of law enforcement and the     
U. S. Justice Department against the so-called Patriots.   
Adopting a network structure is not, therefore, necessarily a sign that a movement 
or organization is at the cutting edge in the art of conflict.  It may, rather, be a sign of 
distress.  Nor should we think that adopting a network structure will necessarily provide 
relief.  For, like most things, the virtues of a network are, from another perspective, its 
vices.  As autonomous units, network members can sense and respond independently, 
which increases adaptability.  At the same time, however, this autonomy diminishes 
control and coordination.  Diminished control and coordination, in turn, can increase the 
difficulty of accomplishing complex tasks and the likelihood that an ill-judged action will 
undermine the entire network.  For example, Patriot groups and militias with whom the 
bomber of the Federal building in Oklahoma City had had contact scrambled to dissociate 
themselves from him as police investigations of his contacts intensified in the aftermath 
of the bombing.  Martha Crenshaw argues that the entire Front for the Liberation of 
Quebec (FLQ) suffered a serious setback in 1970 when one of its independent cells 
kidnapped and murdered Pierre Laporte, the Quebec Minister of Labor.  Divisions within 
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the PLO network have caused similar problems for Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian 
cause.27 
Perhaps even more important than control over tactical and strategic decisions for 
the success or failure of a terrorist organization is control over communications.28  As it 
increases the autonomy of its members, a network structure leads to diminished control 
over the number and kinds of communications that take place in the network.  This 
increases discovery and entry opportunities for those outside the network, including its 
enemies.  This characteristic of network organization imposes a high cost on terrorist 
groups who adopt such a structure, since communicating is the greatest vulnerability of a 
clandestine organization.  Being part of a network or building one, therefore, will be very 
risky for terrorists.  Ramzi Yousef, the organizer of the attack on the World Trade Center 
and the very model of a new terrorist, was undone by a new component of his network 
who turned him in.  Even the more hierarchically structured terrorist groups are likely to 
be networked with concentric circles of supporters and then sympathizers, with whom 
they must communicate.  Good tradecraft and encryption can limit the risks of such 
communication but cannot completely remove them.  For any organization with 
something to hide, an organizational form that diminishes control over communication 
increases risk.  If terrorist networking is looser now than it was in the past, then terrorists 
are increasing their operational risks.  The quick arrests following the embassy bombings 
in Africa in 1998 resulted from luck but also, apparently, from the fact that the loose, 
networked structure of bin Laden’s organization allowed outsiders a number of different 
opportunities to gather information about it.29  
Like the networked terrorism to which it is related, amateur or ad hoc terrorism 
provides advantages that from another perspective become disadvantages.  Amateurs are 
hard to spot and hard to threaten because they have no permanent organization and 
infrastructure; but because they have no permanent organization and infrastructure, they 
have a limited ability to train, learn lessons, or develop counterintelligence and other 
skills.  They are, therefore, easier to penetrate, once discovered, than professionals and 
liable to make shocking blunders, as the history of the group that bombed the World 
Trade Center indicates.  It is true that if they are not assisted by a state, amateur terrorists 
will have more freedom to operate because they will not be constrained by that state's 
political agenda.  It is also true, however, that lacking state support, amateurs are likely to 
lack the resources to exploit this freedom, even if they take advantage of the 
opportunities for resource mobilization supplied by modern means of communication.  
Usama bin Laden may be an exception in this regard.  Ramzi Yousef, on the other hand, 
claimed that he was not able to use a chemical agent in his attack on the World Trade 
Center because he did not have enough money to buy the required amount of cyanide.30  
Given the weaknesses of amateurs, it may well be to our advantage if terrorists are now 
more amateurish than they were, although as we have noted, this unfortunately is 
probably not the case or will not be for long.  
The first two characteristics of the supposedly new terrorism—a network structure 
and amateur participants—would not necessarily make terrorism more dangerous than it 
was, even if they were truly new characteristics of terrorism.  What about mass casualty 
attacks or the possible use of CBNR?  Do these make the new terrorism more dangerous?  
To answer this question we must consider what we mean by ‘more dangerous’.  If we 
mean by this term hurting more people, then by definition a tendency to more mass 
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casualty attacks would mean that terrorism had become more dangerous.  But if we mean 
by ‘more dangerous’ that terrorism is more likely to achieve its goals, goals that are 
inimical to the interests of the countries and people it targets, then more mass casualty 
attacks are not necessarily more dangerous.  Terrorists have scored several mass casualty 
attacks in the Middle East, but these have not gotten the terrorists closer to their 
objective.  Neither have the mass casualty attacks in the United States gotten the 
perpetrators of these attacks closer to theirs.    
 The use of a CBNR weapon to produce mass casualties, on the other hand, might 
well be an exception to the claim that mass casualty attacks are not inherently more 
dangerous than other kinds of terrorist attacks.   Because of the psychological effect that 
such an attack is likely to have, it might well do damage out of proportion to the number 
killed.  One such attack might move terrorists closer to achieving their objectives than 
other kinds of mass casualty attacks.  Even in this case, however, the danger posed by 
such an attack would depend on the political preparations for and the technical response 
to it. 
The argument so far about the danger of mass casualty or CBNR attacks assumes 
that they occur in isolation.  A string of such attacks occurring in a coordinated fashion in 
a relatively short period of time would certainly pose greater danger, by any definition, 
than one or two unrelated incidents occurring several years apart.  But such a string of 
attacks, especially if intended to occur within one of the advanced industrial countries, 
would be possible probably only with a planning, security and logistical capability that 
would be beyond what the new terrorists would be capable of.  In fact, such a string of 
attacks would very likely be impossible without state support. 
What should we conclude finally about the threat posed by the supposedly new 
terrorism?  It is possible that terrorists could get hold of a CBNR weapon and devastate a 
city.  Without minimizing the damage this would do, especially the possible political 
damage, we must conclude that this is not the greatest threat posed by terrorism.  The 
economies and societies of the industrial countries are wealthy enough and networked 
enough and their political life, or so we must hope, principled and resilient enough to 
survive such an attack.  As far as terrorism is concerned, what has always posed the 
greatest threat is the shrewd and ruthless use of terrorism in the service of a strategically 
significant objective contrary to the interests of the target country or government, 
especially when this kind of terrorism has had the backing of an equally clever and 
ruthless state authority.  From this perspective, the lethality of a group is not critical.  
Neither is it critical whether a particular group is networked or hierarchical or composed 
of amateurs or professionals.  Networks and hierarchies have different strengths and 
weaknesses and are thus suited for different environments and tasks.31  The critical issue 
is whether terrorists and their sponsors can adapt their structure and strategy, including 
their use of violence, to their environment and to the degree and kind of pressure that 
governments can bring to bear against them.  Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), for 
example, ‘reorganized itself from a largely decentralized system’ to a more centrally 
controlled one in 1974 ‘to survive government repression and heavy attrition of 
membership ranks’.32  Those terrorists and supporters that are adaptable in this way, that 
have strategic sense, are shrewd and ruthless, toward themselves and their enemies, are 
likely to survive the longest, become more professional, and over the long-term more 
lethal.   Above all, they will pose the greatest danger.  
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